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Abstract
We set-up a two-sided market framework to model competition be-
tween a Prefered Provider Organization (PPO) and a Health Maintenance
Organization (HMO). Both health plans compete to attract policyholders
on one side and providers on the other side. The PPO, which is charac-
terized by a higher diversity of providers, attracts riskier policyholders.
Our two-sided framework allows to examine the consequences of this risk
segmentation on the providers’ side, especially in terms of remuneration.
The outcome of competition mainly depends on two eﬀects: a demand ef-
fect, inﬂuenced by the value put by policyholders on providers access and
an adverse selection eﬀect, captured by the characteristics of the health
risk distribution. If the adverse selection eﬀect is too strong, the HMO
gets a higher proﬁt in equilibrium. On the contrary, if the demand ef-
fect dominates, the PPO proﬁt is higher in spite of the unfavorable risk
segmentation. We believe that our model, by highlighting the two-sided
market structure of the health plans’ competition, provides new insights
to understand the increase in the PPOs’ market share observed during
the last decade in the US.
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work Eﬀects, Adverse Selection.
Jel Codes: I11, L11, L42.
∗We thank Pierre-Yves Geoﬀard and Bruno Jullien for helpful discussions, two anonymous
referees and a co-editor for their comments. We also thank the participants of the Workshops
of Health Economics organized in Leuven (2006) and Konstanz (2006), and the participants
of ECHE (2006) in Budapest.
†University of Rosario, Bogota and Toulouse School of Economics.
‡Toulouse School of Economics.
11 Introduction
Adverse selection is often presented as a major problem for competitive health
insurance markets (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 1998). This phenomenon occurs
when premiums set by health plans do not perfectly reﬂect the heterogeneity
in policyholders’ health risk. This imperfect risk adjustment can be caused by
diﬀerent reasons. For example, it may be impossible or too costly for insurers to
set diﬀerentiated premiums taking into account the risk factors that would allow
to reﬂect this heterogeneity. The regulation of health insurance contracts can
also prevent health plans from setting premiums in an individual risk adjustment
fashion. Moreover, when policyholders subscribe health insurance contracts
linked to their jobs, employers often supply a menu of health insurance plans
and also set employee premiums for each plan provided (Pauly et al., 2004). In
this case, health plans’ premiums reﬂect diﬀerences in average total cost and
not in individual expected health expenditure.
In this context, policyholders may be tempted, in an attempt to look for
a health plan that supplies coverage against the lowest possible premium, to
withdraw from plans that attract higher risks than himself. In a dynamical set-
ting, this behavior can lead to a “death spiral” phenomenon (Buchmueller and
Feldstein, 1997), whereby less restrictive plans attract high risks and therefore
repel low and medium risks, with a cumulative eﬀect. When an interior equilib-
rium occurs, high risks choose generous plans whereas low risks seek lower prices
(Altman et al., 1998). In equilibrium, since premiums reﬂect the average cost
of a health plan’s policyholders, the surplus of a policyholder depends on the
characteristics of the other enrollees. This can be viewed as a negative network
externality between policyholders.
As Chernew and Frick (1999) suggest, it is important to add a new variable
(that they call “managedness”) to the classical adverse selection models in or-
der to capture fully the nature of managed care competition. For the health
insurance sector, it seems that the diversity of physicians to whom policyholders
have access is an instrument that strongly inﬂuences risk segmentation. Indeed,
when MCOs adopt the Health Maintenance Organizations’ form, policyhold-
ers cannot choose a physician outside the list of physicians aﬃliated to their
HMOs. By contrast, in a Prefered Providers Organization policyholders can
choose physicians who do not belong to the list of the network.1 In contexts
where health insurers are constrained from charging risk-rated premiums- such
as in employer-sponsored multiple option beneﬁts program or a regulated mar-
ket - there is a tendency for higher risk consumers to select PPOs and lower
risk policyholders to enroll in HMOs (Cutler and Reber [1998], Strombom et al.
[2002], Buchmueller and DiNardo [2002], and Buchmueller and Liu [2006]).2
1However they may be charged for such a decision.
2We thank an anonymous co-editor for pointing out these references to us.
2The present paper is among the ﬁrst attempts3 to model the two-sided nature
of health plans’ competition. By this we mean that health insurance markets
are characterized by indirect network externalities between providers and poli-
cyholders’ sides. Roughly speaking, a market structure is two-sided when “an
end-user does not internalize the full impact of his use of the platform on the
welfare of another category of end-users.” (Rochet and Tirole, 2005). In prac-
tice, health plans compete for policyholders on one side but also compete to
attract physicians on the other side. The goal of our model is to shed some
lights on indirect network externalities between these two sides of the health
insurance market.
An asymmetric duopoly situation is considered in order to model competi-
tion between a PPO and a HMO, where the PPO is characterized by a larger
network of providers. We use a vertical diﬀerentiation framework to capture the
health risk heterogeneity between policyholders. The higher the risk of a poli-
cyholder, the more he values the diversity of providers, implying that the PPO
attracts, on average, riskier policyholders.4 In such framework, we compare
the equilibrium proﬁts of the HMO and the PPO. Which organization makes
a higher proﬁt depends mainly on two ingredients: the intensity of preference
for diversity that characterizes policyholders and the health risk distribution’s
characteristics. First, on the policyholders’ side, the PPO can charge a higher
premium than the HMO thanks to the higher diversity supplied. Our results
show that, all other things equal, a higher preference for diversity always plays
in favor of the PPO. Second we show that the skewness of the risk distribution
generates a complex interaction between the policyholders’ and the providers’
sides. When the upper tail of the risk distribution is thick enough, the PPO
beneﬁts from a higher demand but suﬀers from a strong adverse selection eﬀect.
If this adverse selection eﬀect dominates, the HMO is able to make more proﬁt
by paying lower fee-for-service rates to its providers. By contrast, when this
upper tail is not too thick the PPO makes higher proﬁts in equilibrium. Our
two-sided model provides new insights that might explain why, in spite of the
unfavorable risk segmentation, PPOs have, in the USA, increased their market
share at the expense of HMOs during the last decade.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 is devoted to the equilibrium anal-
ysis. Section 4 concludes, and discusses possible directions for extending our
results.
3Two recent exceptions are Howell (2006) who provides a taxonomy for thinking about
competition in health care markets and Pezzino and Pignatoro (2006) for a two-sided ap-
proach applied to hospitals that compete for doctors and patients. See also the last section
in Demange and Geoﬀard (2007).
4This risk segmentation eﬀect is already present in Baranes and Bardey (2008) in a context
of competition between MCOs and conventional insurers. More precisely, their model follows
the Salinger’s framework in which vertical integrated insurers compete with conventional in-
surers (no integrated insurers). In such context, the remuneration of the providers who do not
belong to a MCO is determined by a wholesale price which does not respond to a two-sided
market mechanism. In other terms, they do not consider the impact of the network sizes on
the physicians’ remuneration.
32 The model
Three kinds of agents are considered:
• policyholders, who can become ill with an exogenous probability (no ex
ante moral hazard is considered here). This probability θ is heterogenous
across policyholders and is private information (we call it the “type” of
the policyholder). It is distributed on (0,1) according to a density f that
is everywhere positive. The cumulative distribution function is denoted
F.
• Physicians, who may decide to be aﬃliated with a health plan or not.
• Two competing health plans, indexed by i, with i = {PPO,HMO}. They
provide health insurance contracts to policyholders and buy health care
services from physicians.
When a policyholder (insured by i) becomes ill, he has the possibility to
consult with any of the physicians who belong to i. The proportion of physicians
(between 0 and 1) aﬃliated with network i is denoted Ji. Thus a higher Ji means
more choice. The policyholder utility in case of illness uI is thus an increasing
function of Ji and of his net income c. For convenience, we adopt a separable
speciﬁcation5
uI(c,Ji) = u(c) − γ + λJi, (1)
where u is the utility in the absence of illness, γ is a nonpecuniary cost of
being ill, and the parameter λ > 0 captures how patients value potential access
to more physicians.6 We assume that γ ≥ λ. Note that there is an indirect
externality, since the decisions of physicians to join one network have an impact
on the utilities of policyholders. For simplicity, we assume that policyholders
are fully insured: there is no copayment in case of illness.
The expected utility of a policyholder of type θ aﬃliated with insurer i is:
EU = u(w − Pi) + θ[−γ + λJi], (2)
where Pi is the premium paid by the policyholder to his insurer.
We assume that the premium is not too large (in comparison with the wealth
of the policyholder) so that utility function u can be taken as linear (that is,
5Suppose for example that each illness can be cured by exactly one physician. The prob-
ability that this doctor is accessible to the patient is Ji. λ corresponds to the net utility of
being cured. (γ − λ) can be viewed as the utility loss caused by the treatment.
6This eﬀect is very close to the Gal-Or’s ex post diﬀerentiation eﬀect (see Gal-Or [1997]
and [1999]). This diversity valuation can also be viewed as a special case of Chernew and
Frick’s managedness variable.
4wealth eﬀects can be neglected).7 Using this simpliﬁcation, and normalizing
u′(w) to 1, we can approximate EU (up to a constant) by:
Uθ(Pi,Ji) = θλJi − Pi. (3)
The two health plans compete for policyholders on one side and physicians
on the other side. The proﬁt function of health plan i is:
Πi = DiPi − Ti (4)
where Di is the number of policyholders aﬃliated with health plan i and Ti
the total transfer paid to physicians. We assume that health plans are for-proﬁt
entities and have no other objective than maximizing their proﬁts.
3 The outcome of competition between health
plans
We ﬁrst analyze the determination of market shares on policyholders’ side. Next,
we analyze physicians’ side. Finally, we determine the global market equilibrium.
3.1 Risk segmentation among policyholders
On the policyholders’ side, the market shares of the two insurers, namely DPPO
and DHMO, determine the risk segmentation. More precisely, a policyholder
characterized by a probability of illness θ chooses the PPO rather than the
HMO if:
Uθ(PPPO,JPPO) ≥ Uθ(PHMO,JHMO)
To ﬁx ideas, we assume that the PPO has more physicians aﬃliated than
the HMO: JPPO > JHMO. We prove later that this property is satisﬁed in
equilibrium.
In the case where the health insurance market is completely covered, the
marginal policyholder’s type ˜ θ is the one who is just indiﬀerent between the





Policyholders with a large probability of illness (θ ≥ ˜ θ) choose the PPO,
since it oﬀers a larger diversity of physicians (JPPO ≥ JHMO). Parameter λ
captures the intensity of preferences for diversity. All other things equal, if λ
increases, the price elasticity of policyholders’ demand decreases.
7This assumption is not contradictory with a demand for insurance by policyholders (global
risk aversion) if we consider illnesses with a very small probability of occurrence and a large
cost of treatment. The premium will be small (so that wealth eﬀects can be neglected) but
uninsured people would face a large loss in case of illness and hence households prefer to buy
insurance ex ante.
53.2 Physicians’ diversity
For simplicity, we focus on the case where health plans do not compete for
the same physicians. Thus, the two health plans have access to identical (but
distinct) pools of physicians.8 Think for example of a Hotelling type of model
where a mass 1 of physicians are uniformly “located” on a (0,1) interval and
incur a transportation cost proportional to their distance with the PPO (located
at 0) or the HMO (located at 1). We consider the case where the physicians’
market is not covered. This means that the numbers JPPO and JHMO of physi-
cians aﬃliated respectively to PPO and HMO satisfy JPPO +JHMO < 1, and
thus that the remaining (1−JPPO −JHMO) physicians remain unaﬃliated. In
this case, the number Ji of physicians who aﬃliate with health plan i is only
function of the net proﬁt level9 Φi oﬀered by this health plan. Since we as-
sume an uniform distribution of physicians, this function is linear: Ji = Φi
δ . δ
represents the “transportation” cost of physicians and measures the sensitivity
of physicians’ supply to the net remuneration oﬀered by health plans. To ﬁx
ideas we assume that doctors are remunerated by a fee-for-service rate Ri (if
they aﬃliate with insurer i). Their proﬁt level (including the cost of the time
spent with the patient, which we call the “treatment cost”) equals the product
of the “proﬁt margin” oﬀered by the insurer (fee-for-service minus unit cost of
treatment) by the level of activity that the physician expects to have if he joins
the network. This expected activity level is equal to the expected number of
consultations in the network, divided by the number of physicians aﬃliated.















where c denotes the unit cost of treatment.10 These formulas reveal the second
indirect externality present in our model, this time from policyholders to physi-
cians: the expected level of activity of physicians depends on the number and
type of policyholders who join the insurer.
8We have checked that the case JPPO + JHMO = 1 leads to similar results but with
computations much more complicated. Besides, the Hotelling’s framework is well known to
not suit well to pass from uncovered to covered markets. Moreover, it is worth noticing that
in pratice we observe that some physicians remain unaﬃliated.
9This proﬁt is deﬁned as the total remuneration of the physician, net of the cost (essentially
the opportunity cost of time for the doctor) of examining and treating patients. It could be
interesting to include non monetary aspects of a physician’s utility, such as an altruistic
component like in Jack (2005), Choné and Ma (2007) and Bardey and Lesur (2007).
10As pointed out by an anonymous referee, higher risk patients are likely to be more costly
to treat on a per-visit basis. We have checked that introducing this additional feature would
not alter signiﬁcantly our results. A diﬀerent version of the model that incorporates this
feature is available upon request.
6Thus health plans compete in two dimensions: the level Pi of insurance
premiums and the number Ji of physicians they oﬀer access to. In other words,
we assume that they adjust the level of remuneration of their aﬃliated doctors
(through Ri or Φi) in such a way that it allows to attract exactly the Ji doctors
that decide to aﬃliate with insurer i. The assumption that health plans do not
compete for the same doctors implies:11
ΦPPOJPPO = δJ2










Note that the above formulas show the neutrality of our assumption that
doctors are remunerated by fees-for-service. We could have assumed instead a
capitation system. Since there is no uncertainty about the number and com-
position of the clientele of each physician (given the health plan they aﬃliate
with), the strategic variable for each insurer is the net remuneration Φi they
oﬀer to physicians, independently of the way it is obtained.12
The structure of the two markets is represented in the ﬁgure below.
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Figure 1: Market structure
11This assumption is satisﬁed as long as JHMO + JPPO < 1.
12We must recognize that the neutrality of the remuneration scheme is due to the providers’
risk neutrality assumption. A possible extension of this model would be to consider risk averse
providers. We guess that it would not change qualitatively the results. Indeed, as it is pointed
out in Newhouse (1996), more prospective payment implies a risk transfer from insurers to
providers. Therefore, in case of risk averse providers, the use of capitation payment would only
imply to pay an additional risk premium to providers. However, a more complex challenge
would be to consider both payment schemes i.e. capitation payments and fees-for-service, in
the same framework. This case leads to the a multiplicity of equilibria as in Armstrong (2006).
73.3 Equilibrium
Given our assumptions, health plans’ proﬁts are:









It is convenient to express insurers’ proﬁts in terms of premiums PPPO and
PHMO and physicians numbers JPPO and JHMO. Using (6) and (7), we obtain:



















where we recall that ˜ θ = PPPO−PHMO
λ(JPPO−JHMO).
The PPO selects (PPPO,JPPO) to maximize its proﬁt, taking (PHMO,JHMO)
as given. The symmetric property holds for the HMO. The ﬁrst-order conditions
with respect to PPPO and PHMO give respectively
∂ΠPPO
∂PPPO






















PPPO = ˜ θc + λ(JPPO − JHMO)













(1 − 2F(˜ θ))
f(˜ θ)
, (10)
and ﬁnally the two market shares are given by:
DPPO = 1 − F(˜ θ),
DHMO = F(˜ θ).
Thus we see that the market shares on the policyholders’ side only depend
on the properties of F, the distribution of risks. If F satisﬁes the monotone
hazard rate property, there is an unique ˜ θ that satisﬁes equation (10). In the
case of an iso-elastic distribution F(˜ θ) = ˜ θ
ǫ
we obtain:




















This shows that the market share of the PPO (the one with the larger variety
of physicians) is always larger than 1/2, and increases with parameter ǫ, which
captures the concentration of high risks.
The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to JPPO and JHMO give respectively
−
￿
PPPO − ˜ θc
￿ ∂˜ θ
∂JPPO
f(˜ θ) − 2δJPPO = 0,
and
￿





− 2δJHMO = 0.
Replacing PPPO and PHMO by their values given by (8) and (9), and using
again the fact that ∂˜ θ

















Note that the PPO has always more than half of the market: F(˜ θ) < 1/2.
This implies that the PPO has also more physicians (JPPO > JHMO) than the
HMO. This property was assumed from the start and needed to be checked in
equilibrium.
The equilibrium fee-for-service rates are respectively:































Finally, premiums are given by:






[1 − F(˜ θ)],
and







Note that the PPO charges a higher premium than the HMO (PPPO >


















1 − F(˜ θ)
F(˜ θ)
×
E[θ|θ < ˜ θ]
E[θ|θ > ˜ θ]
. (13)
This formula illustrates how the PPO can, in somes cases, paradoxically
beneﬁt from attracting riskier policyholders. Indeed, the higher volume of ac-
tivity (per patient) that it can oﬀer to its aﬃliated physicians (since E[θ|θ >
˜ θ] > E[θ|θ < ˜ θ]) reduces the equilibrium level of fee-for-services rates (second
ratio in the formula above). However to obtain higher market share on the
policyholders’ side implies attracting more physicians and thus oﬀering more
remuneration to them (ﬁrst ratio). Which eﬀect dominates depend on the char-
acteristics of the distribution F. Thus the PPO can, in some cases, pay lower
10fees than the HMO. This case occurs only when the market share eﬀect dom-
inates the adverse selection eﬀect. Dor et al. (2004) observe that, on average,
PPOs’ price are 8% lower than conventional insurers’ ones, while HMOs obtain
a discount of 24%. In our two-sided context, it means that the adverse selection
eﬀect dominates the demand’s one.






= 1 + ǫ,









This ratio may be greater or smaller than 1, depending on the value of ǫ, as it
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Figure 2: Fee-for service rates ratio








The uniform distribution case allows to illustrate that when ǫ is low enough,
the demand eﬀect dominates, and the PPO is able to pay a lower fees-for-service
11to its physicians. For higher values of ǫ, the adverse selection eﬀect dominates
and the opposite result occurs: the HMO pays lower fee-for-service rates.
Proposition 1 When λ
δ is small enough,13 the market equilibrium is charac-
terized by the following properties:
• The market shares on the policyholders’ side only depends on the distri-
bution of risks:
˜ θ =
(1 − 2F(˜ θ))
f(˜ θ)
. (14)















• The mark-ups on insurance premiums increase with λ and decrease with
δ:






[1 − F(˜ θ)],







By replacing premiums and physicians’ numbers by their equilibrium values








[1 − F(˜ θ)]2 − c
￿￿ 1
˜ θ









F(˜ θ)2 − c
￿￿ ˜ θ
0
(θ − ˜ θ)dF(θ)
￿
.
The ﬁrst terms in these formulas capture the impact of the market share
eﬀect on the networks’ proﬁt. By oﬀering more choice, the PPO secures a








The second terms in the above formulas represent the impact of the adverse
selection eﬀect: the incremental cost of inframarginal patients is positive for
the PPO (since θ > ˜ θ on (˜ θ,1)), while it is negative for the HMO (since θ < ˜ θ
on (0,˜ θ)). Which eﬀect dominates depends on the parameters, as shows in
Proposition 2.
13The precise condition is λ
δ < 2
˜ θ, where ˜ θ is the unique solution of (14). This condition
ensures that JHMO + JPPO < 1, which was assumed initially.
12Proposition 2 The equilibrium proﬁt of the PPO is higher than that of the
HMO if λ2
4δc > K(˜ θ), with K(˜ θ) =
￿ 1
0 |˜ θ−θ|dF(˜ θ)
(1−2F(˜ θ))˜ θ
2
Proof. By the above formulas we have:






[1 − 2F(˜ θ)] − c
￿ 1
0
|θ − ˜ θ|dF(θ),
hence the desired result.
The contribution of Proposition 2 is to identify the main parameters that
inﬂuence the market outcome. More precisely, in equilibrium, the PPO makes
a lower proﬁt than the HMO if policyholders’ preference for diversity (captured
by λ) is low enough. The parameters δ and c work in the opposite direction.
The proﬁts’ comparison also depends on the characteristics of the health risk
distribution. The HMO has a higher proﬁt as long as the adverse selection eﬀect
is stronger than the demand eﬀect. In this case, the providers’ side component
of the health plans’ proﬁt function is in favor of the HMO and can more than
oﬀset the higher premium set by the PPO on the policyholders’ side. This
situation is in line with some studies that have revealed that PPOs can suﬀer
from death spirals too (Yegian et al., 2000). On the contrary, if the demand
eﬀect is stronger than the adverse selection eﬀect, then the PPO ”wins” on both
sides.14 Another situation in which the PPO can get higher proﬁt occurs when
the higher premium obtained on policyholders’ side can more than oﬀset the
higher fee-for-service rate paid on providers’ side. This result might explain
why PPOs have increased their market share during the last decade at expense
of HMOs.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the outcome of competition between a PPO and
a HMO. Our two-sided framework helps identifying conditions under which a
PPO can get a higher proﬁt than a HMO in line with the rise in “intermediate
managed care plans” such as PPOs (Morrisey and Jensen, 1997). Indeed, the
growth of PPOs not only coincided with general growth of managed care, but
during the last decade, has come also at the expense of other managed care
forms as HMOs (Hirth et al., 2007).15
As mentioned in Howell (2006), the two-sided nature of the health care
industry may have some important implications for competition policy issues.
14It is worth noticing that the indirect externality eﬀect revealed by our two-sided structure
is consistent with Sorensen (2003)’s empirical results who shows that the market share of
Health Plans has a positive impact on their bargaining power vis-à-vis providers.
15The PPOs’ market share in the employer-sponsored market grew from 11% to 55% between
1988 and 2004. Moreover, between 1999 and 2004, it is worth mentioning that PPOs’ market
share rose by 16% while conventional insurers’ enrollment decreased by only 5% (Kaiser, 2004).
Hirth et al (2006) interprets this as a growth of PPOs’ market share at the expense of HMOs’.
13Even if our paper only provides a ﬁrst analysis, our model allows to highlight
the role of indirect externalities between the two sides of the market. More
precisely, using a one-sided logic, one could have thought that the unfavorable
risk segmentation faced by the more ﬂexible health plans would systematically
encourage MCOs to restrict the choice of physicians. In such a context, vertical
agreements could have been perceived as anticompetitive: the more restrictive is
the health plan, the lower is the risk of his policyholders and the higher its proﬁt.
On the contrary, our two-sided framework allows to explain the phenomenon of
higher ﬂexibility that has been observed during the last decade in the United
States. In terms of competition policy, this suggests that the degree of vertical
integration in the health insurance sector does not systematically introduce
competitive distortions.
Our analysis could be extended in several directions:
• Introducing a copayment whenever a patient visits a physician outside
his healthcare network can be a useful policy instrument for health plans.
MCOs usually use copayments as an incentive to limit expenses. Analyzing
such copayments would require to model the patients’ ex post choices
between physicians belonging to their network and the others.
• It might be relevant to introduce other types of heterogeneity among physi-
cians such as their degree of altruism (see Jack [2005] and Choné and Ma
[2007]) or outside options (or opportunity cost of their time). In this case,
the features of our equilibrium could be changed. Physicians with a high
opportunity cost of time would probably prefer to choose the health plan
with the lowest demand for health care.
• It could be interesting to add an ex post moral hazard component to the
model. Controls on utilization are stronger in HMOs structures and may
lead to a lower level of health care consumption. This could reduce the
possibilities of PPOs to compete successfully with HMOs.16
• We have used a duopoly model. It would also be interesting to extend it
to an oligopoly framework in order to analyze concentrations and mergers
aspects.17 An oligopoly framework would also allow to analyze the relative
bargaining powers of health plans and physicians groups according to the
relative concentration of their markets.18
• We have assumed exclusivity: physicians can only be aﬃliated with an
unique MCO. In practice, some physicians work for several networks and
are not constrained by exclusivity contracts. Since health plans are exclu-
sive on the policyholders’ side, this may lead to a “competitive bottleneck”
situation as described in Armstrong (2006).
16We are grateful to two anonymous referees for pointing out this eﬀect.
17This is done in Gal-Or (1999).
18One could extend the analysis of Brooks et al. (1997) to a two-sided framework.
14In conclusion, let us repeat that although this paper focuses on some speciﬁc
dimensions, the analysis provided here already suggests some interesting conse-
quences of the two-sided nature of the health insurance market. As advocated
eloquently by Wright (2004), policy makers have to be careful in order to avoid
the fallacies of one-sided logic applied to a two-sided context.
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